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Blast 
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Conor Thompson
BUILDING BEHAVIOR 
AND KEY ELEMENTS
This paper is a technical research paper 
on blast resistant building designs. 
Due to the abundance of information and 
research in this field, our primary focus 
was on building behavior and the key 
elements that contribute to the design. 
Blast resistant building design is the 
enhancement of building security against 
the effects of explosives in both architectural 
and structural design process and design 
techniques. As seen in the paper, there is 
much research to be done on this subject 
in the future. 
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ABSTRACT
Terrorist attacks and accidental 
explosions produce extreme and unique 
loading on structures and can cause 
widespread damage to the building, its 
occupants and bystanders. Blast resistant 
building design provides structural integrity 
and acceptable levels of safety for buildings.  
The behavior of the building during a blast 
event is dictated by the magnitude and 
location of the blast, as well as the structural 
properties of the building. Non-structural 
elements such as standoff distances, safety 
glass, and accessible building exits are also 
essential to create a level of safety. Blast 
resistant building design creates additional 
levels of safety and redundancy that protect 
the well-being of the occupant as well as the 
structural integrity of the building.
LIST OF TERMS
BRBD – Blast resistant building design
Tb – Time duration of blast
Tn – Natural period of structure
HVM – Hostile vehicle mitigation
VSB – Vehicle safety barrier
IED – Improvised explosive device
1. INTRODUCTION
Blast resistant building design (BRBD) 
has been a growing concern for researchers 
and building owners in the United States. 
Government and military structures, 
often the target of wartime and terrorist 
attacks, are required to design for blast 
loading. In the aftermath of September 
11th, and with terrorist attacks worldwide, 
the United States people have made 
structural safety a priority. When a blast 
event occurs, the demands placed on the 
structure are typically beyond the design 
capacity for lateral loading. Buildings that 
are subjected to loads beyond their capacity 
will fall due to structure failure and create 
hazards for occupants. For this reason 
it is typically costly for buildings to be 
designed to encounter large explosions in 
close proximity. The goals of blast resistant 
building design are to provide acceptable 
safety to the occupant while keeping the 
overall cost of the structure within reason; 
however, this paper will not cover the cost-
benefit ratio of blast design.
Blast load design can account for 
accidental explosions, such as those in 
chemical manufacturing plant, and also 
preemptive explosions such as car bombs 
and other explosive detonations. The 
Department of Defense (DoD), along with 
other government agencies, has been 
researching improved structural responses 
during extreme loads. The location and 
magnitude of extreme blast loads are 
difficult to make precautions for and 
predict. The design process must involve 
architects and blast consultants as well 
as the structural engineers. To deal with 
the growing demand for blast resistant 
structures, the designers and building 
owners look into nonstructural aspects of 
blast mitigation.  This includes creating 
defensive standoff distances, requiring 
bag and personal screenings and installing 
safety glass to prevent casualties. 
While these nonstructural design 
components may conflict with the aesthetic 
goals of building owners and architects, 
this construction must coexist in order to 
mitigate potential threat and reduce the 
danger to more elegant-looking, light and 
graceful buildings. Many injuries sustained 
by occupants occur due to flying debris such 
as glass and building fragments.1 The flying 
debris can cause more damage to occupants 
than the actual explosion in many cases.
While all of these design aspects increase 
the safety and usability of structures during 
an explosion, the cost benefit of design must 
be taken into account with the risk and 
probability of the blast occurring. Adding 
protection can save lives, but in the end, the 
building owner must have justifiable reasons 
for spending the additional money.
In the aftermath 
of September 11th, 
and with terrorist attacks 
worldwide, the United States 
people have made structural 
safety a priority.
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2. BUILDING RESPONSE TO BLAST
Blast events bring about two concerns in 
building behavior. The first concern is the 
initial blast. At the time the blast occurs, 
the loading of the blast and the pressure 
waves created can cause extreme situations 
that were not considered in the design. The 
second concern is the building behavior 
once the blast impulse subsides. After the 
initial impulse has passed, the dynamic 
behavior of the building can also cause high 
levels of stress and strain as the building 
continues to shake back and forth.
In determining how to create blast 
resistant structures, the building behavior 
during a blast must be taken into account.  
Duration of an explosion is typically 
between 0.1-0.001 seconds. This short 
amount of time is often much less than the 
natural period of the building.  As shown in 
Figure 1, during an explosion the blast wave 
initially creates an area of high pressure, 
followed by a vacuum wave of negative 
pressure. However, the negative pressure 
can be ignored when analyzing the blast 
effect as it has little effect on the maximum 
response of the structure. 
When analyzing the response of the 
structure, it is crucial to know the properties 
of the building and the predicted blast 
duration. The phase duration of the blast 
will be known as Tb and the natural period 
of the building as Tn. If Tb is much longer 
than Tn , the building will produce a mostly 
static response to the blast loading. In a 
static response, there is a force, a reaction 
and a deformation. The blast essentially 
acts like a force that is slowly (with respect 
to the structure’s natural vibration) applied 
along the structure. This means that the 
maximum building displacement will have 
occurred before the blast phase is over. 
When this is the case, the response of the 
building is dictated by the stiffness, elastic 
modulus and magnitude of the extreme 
load. A building that has been designed with 
a large value of stiffness will experience 
less static deformation. When Tb happens 
to be much shorter than Tn the loading is 
treated as an impulse load. This causes the 
maximum displacement to occur after the 
blast has subsided and the deformation will 
be determined through dynamic response 
calculation. If Tb happens to be almost 
identical to Tn, large deformations, similar to 
those caused from earthquake loading, must 
be taken into consideration. By analyzing 
these maximum dynamic responses, 
buildings can be designed to sustain the 
maximum strains that result.3
During the blast the nonstructural 
elements are also subjected to damage. As 
the initial pressure wave makes contact 
with the building facade, windows usually 
shatter and the building’s walls and columns 
deflect under the immediate pressure. When 
the blast intensity is too great, the walls and 
facade may suffer permanent displacements 
as the strain causes plastic deformation, 
or even structural collapse. If the facade 
does not remain intact during the blast, the 
pressure waves may cause upwards and 
downwards pressure on the floor slabs and 
columns. These pressures may produce 
loading reversals that the slabs and columns 
have not been designed for. Figure 2 shows
Figure 1. Qualitative pressure-time history 2
When the blast intensity 
is too great, the walls and 
façade may suffer permanent 
displacements as the strain 
causes plastic deformation, 
or even structural collapse.
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a visual representation of the uplift pressure 
and reverse loading.
Floor slabs are typically designed with 
a downward gravity loading in mind. This 
design approach calls for placing rebar to 
resist flexural bending. When the moments 
change direction, the flexural reinforcement 
is no longer resisting the bending. This 
reverse loading may cause shear cracking 
in the slabs. Perez reported that this case 
of reverse loading was the cause for the 
structural collapse of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City.5 
Figure 3 shows a computer simulated 
image of the Oklahoma City explosion. 
As the pressure wave extends outwards, 
the glass windows become deadly as the 
fragmented shards are projected both 
inwards and outwards. While the building 
may not collapse, a high number of 
casualties may still result from nonstructural 
elements.  Approximately two thirds of 
non-fatal casualties in the Oklahoma City 
bombing were due to glass shards.6
Once the duration of the pressure wave 
has passed, the building is still in danger 
of further damage. The blast impulse has 
transferred its momentum to the building. 
The building responds by vibrating back 
and forth freely, or oscillating, at its natural 
frequency. The building’s natural frequency, 
or the time required to complete one 
oscillation, is a structural property that 
depends on the mass and stiffness of a 
structure. Knowing the structural properties 
is essential in the calculation of response. 
These dynamic or movement calculations 
can be complicated and are usually left to 
the aid of finite element software. To model 
this behavior, engineers approximate the 
building by assuming it behaves as a single 
degree of freedom mass-spring structure. 
Designing for dynamic response makes 
blast response similar to earthquake design 
loads. A structure is typically designed to 
resist lateral wind loads. Wind loads may 
be designed for 200 lb/ft2  but the pressure 
wave of a blast event can produce loading 
of 7000 lb/ft2, a magnitude 35 times greater. 
Some engineers may think that the blast 
load is a static force load that is applied to 
the building wall. This incorrect assumption 
ignores the dynamic response of the 
building and may lead to an over-designed 
lateral bracing system.8 Designing for blasts 
is thus often left to engineering firms that 
specialize in these extreme loads. 
Progressive collapse, or the failure 
of one member, leads to the progressive 
failure of subsequent members, and is a 
common failure mechanism for buildings 
subjected to blasts. To prevent progressive 
collapse of the structure, a static design 
approach may be used to provide additional 
integrity.  One method involves additional 
reinforcement in the flooring and roofs 
to allow those elements to span over lost 
structural elements and encounter reverse 
loading.9 Another method determines the 
capacity of the structure when selected 
elements are assumed to have failed during 
the blast. This method determines whether 
or not the remaining structure has the 
strength to withstand the new loads and the 
new loading path.  Building codes such as 
those found in ASCE (American Society of 
Civil Engineers) 7 Minimum Design Loads 
for Buildings and Other Structures and 
ACI 318 (American Concrete Institute) have 
addressed design requirements for structural 
integrity.
3. BLAST RESISTANT BUILDING 
COMPONENTS
To analyze blast resistant building design, 
it is essential to examine key physical 
elements within structures, the building 
materials and how the occupants of the 
structure interact with the building.  Before 
divulging into the aforementioned topics, 
it should be noted that all blasts discussed 
in this section will relate to blast attacks 
coming from outside of a structure, generally 
from a hostile threat, such as terrorism.  
Within this generic category of blast attacks, 
events can be categorized as either standoff 
explosions or contact detonations.  Standoff 
explosions are detonated at a distance 
away from the specific target building 
while contact detonations are in contact 
with the target structure.10 The improvised 
Figure 2. Uplift pressure during a blast. 4
Figure 3. Blast Expansion 7
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explosive devices in Figure 4 are examples 
of a potential contact detonation as they 
are lying against the wall of a structure in 
Baghdad, Iraq, and Figure 5 shows a van-
delivered standoff explosion.
Both styles of blast produce a powerful 
wave of positive pressure projected outward 
from the explosion.  Once detonated, the 
pressure wave produced can travel outward 
at over 700 mph.  Although the initial shock 
wave caused by both blasts are the same, 
the actual blast load felt by the structure is 
inversely related to the distance between 
the building and the blast.  The blast load 
is reduced by a cubic factor as the blasts 
location moves away from the building.13 
The simplest way to negate the differences 
in these two blast attacks is to have every 
potential contact detonation turned into a 
standoff explosion, thus lessening the shock 
wave.  Steven H. Miller said that, “for this 
reason, the first principle of blast resistance 
is to limit access to the target.”14  
Similarly, Miller went on to state the 
first priority of limiting access to a structure 
should be that of limiting access by large 
and convenient platforms of explosive 
arrival, such as cars, trucks or vans.  
These techniques, when utilized to remove 
the threat of vehicles, have come to be 
known in the blast resistant building design 
community as hostile vehicle 
mitigation (HVM).
As shown in Figure 6, the top left 
illustration shows no HVM techniques, 
while the other three use speed lessening, 
vehicle indirection or total removal of 
access to the building by approaching 
vehicles.  Once vehicles have gotten within 
an attackable distance of a building target, 
it is necessary to employ vehicle security 
barriers (VSB).  VSBs can be either passive 
or active in the way they mitigate blast 
damage.  Passive barriers do not move and 
can include berms, water, fences or bollards 
among others. Active barriers include 
operable gates, blockers or retractable 
bollards.  Figure 7 shows examples of VSBs 
used in blast design.  
To measure the effectiveness of VSBs a 
rating system was developed and is shown 
in Table 1.  This rating system is based on 
barriers ability to stop a 15,000lb truck 
traveling at a constant speed.  For example, 
the barrier rated at K8 is able to stop the 
15,000lb truck at a speed of 40 mph. At 
impact, the cargo bed of the truck must not 
penetrate more than one meter beyond the 
inside edge of the barrier. 
Now that blast attack styles, hostile 
vehicle mitigation techniques, and vehicle 
security barriers have been discussed, the 
integrated physical security system of a 
blast resistant building can be addressed.  As 
stated before, the first priority in improving 
a buildings blast resistance is the ability to 
limit the overall access to the target.  This is 
achieved first by utilizing vehicle mitigation 
techniques to limit not only the ability of 
Figure 5. Vehicle Standoff Explosion 12
Figure 6. Hostile Vehicle Mitigation 15
Figure 7: Vehicle Security Barriers16
Speed at Impact Barrier Rating
30 mph K4
40 mph K8
50 mph K12
Table 1. U.S. Department of State 2003 
Certification Standards17
Figure 4. IED Baghdad 11
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cars and trucks to get near a structure, but 
also with which the speed they can.  As 
the threat vehicle approaches, at a reduced 
speed, it is met with both passive and 
active VSBs.  Security personnel operate 
the active VSBs. Their job is to examine the 
approaching vehicle and inspect the car or 
truck, its occupants, and their credentials 
before allowing them to proceed into 
the structure.  
The integrated physical security system 
can be seen in Figure 8, which shows the 
techniques used to increase blast resistance 
at a high-value government facility.  Here, 
HVM offset techniques at A reduce speed 
and increase distance from structure.  
Once the vehicle is closer, active VSBs are 
utilized at B, preventing immediate entrance 
into the space.  Throughout the figure, 
passive VSBs can be seen at C, D 
and E.  Overall, these combined systems 
form a site that is increasingly resistant to 
blast attacks, regardless of the construction 
of the critical facility at its center due in 
large part to the large standoff zone, which 
will negate contact detonations from large 
delivery devices and lessen any standoff 
explosions that may occur.  
Most techniques covered so far have 
been in relation to large delivery devices 
such as cars or trucks; many can be modified 
to, or already are useful in deterring smaller 
delivery techniques such as improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) or suicide bombing 
styles.  Water bodies, fences, lighting, and 
increased surveillance techniques are also 
practical approaches in deterring human 
delivered blast attacks.  
While increased standoff distance and 
large delivery prevention are crucial in 
increasing building blast resistance, it is 
sometimes inevitable that a blast attack 
will occur.  This is when the construction 
of the target building and the materials 
chosen will be put to the test.  When a blast 
To analyze blast resistant 
building design, it is essential 
to examine key physical 
elements within structures, 
the building materials 
and how the occupants 
of the structure interact 
with the building. 
Figure 8. Integrated Physical Security System18
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attack occurs outside of a target building, 
generally the walls of the structure are the 
first of its components to be affected by 
the pressure waves generated.  Exterior 
walls must be designed to fail in a ductile 
manner rather than in a brittle manner.  
Because of this, the preferred material for 
exterior wall construction is poured-in-place 
reinforced concrete.  In fact, “virtually all 
new U.S. embassies are constructed using 
this material.”19 This material is preferred 
because it has significant mass, unparalleled 
continuity between members, and extensive 
research and performance testing by the 
military as it is readily used for defensive 
bunkers.  It is essential that the concrete 
be designed in a ductile manner.  Ductile 
design allows for significant deflections of 
structural members before failure. These 
significant deflections warn building 
occupants of the impeding failure, allowing 
time for evacuation. Ductile failures also 
produce less shrapnel, which can reduce 
the injuries caused. Buildings built with 
a non-ductile concrete design can have 
catastrophic consequences when 
subjected to a blast attack.20 As seen in 
Figure 9, the Alfred P. Murrah Building in 
Oklahoma City was constructed using 
non-ductile concrete design and its 
design proved to be catastrophic.  
While not as popular as cast-in-place 
reinforced concrete, pre-cast concrete panels 
are another viable option for constructing 
a blast resistant structure.  These pre-cast 
panels should be at least 5 inches thick 
and have two-way steel reinforcement bars 
to increase ductility, which is still one the 
most necessary properties, which is similar 
to cast-in-place.  Two-way reinforcement 
will aid in the prevention flying concrete 
debris.22 Embedding wire mesh within 
the pre-cast slabs can also reduce flying 
concrete debris. Recently, the blast resistant 
building community has been addressing 
concrete reinforcement in nonconventional 
ways such as the use of embedded fiber 
reinforcement or textile.  Lafarge, the 
building materials company, has produced 
a concrete mixture reinforced with needle-
size steel fibers throughout.  This new style 
of concrete can increase tensile strength by 
up to ten times by providing a better bond 
than conventional steel rebar.23 The steel 
fiber reinforced concrete from Lafarge was 
subjected to blast tests at RAF Spadeadam 
in Cumbria resulting in cracking but no 
shrapnel production.
Improving concrete mixtures and 
reinforcement is not the only way 
blast resistant builders are combatting 
fragmentation of the target structure.  
Surprisingly enough, pickup truck spray 
on bed liners have become a mainstay in 
fragmentation prevention.  Liner treated 
rooms survived a 200 pound TNT explosion 
at 30 feet which destroyed the same room 
that was left untreated.24 The truck bed liners 
Figure 9. Oklahoma City Bombing 21
Designing for blast loads 
has seen an increase 
over the last decade due 
in large part to the events of 
September 11th, 2001, 
the prevalence of terroristic 
threats around the globe and 
the United States’ and United 
Nations’ involvement in 
multiple war zones.
47
are so effective at increasing a buildings 
blast resistance that the pentagon began a 
program to coat the entire building after the 
attacks of September 11th, 2001.25
Although it is essential that the outer 
walls of structures targeted for blast attacks 
be resistant, they are often limited by their 
weakest links, namely windows and doors.  
Windows are incredibly vulnerable during 
a blast attack and it can be hard to prevent 
their failure.  Because of this, windows 
are generally designed to fail before their 
anchoring system, and to fail in a way that 
prevents excessive shards.  It is imperative 
to prevent widespread glass shards, as this 
is responsible for a large number of injuries 
during a blast attack.26 After decreasing 
the number of windows in a blast resistant 
building, the next step is to utilize shard 
reduction techniques such as those in Figure 
10. Here, safety bars, blast curtains or a 
secondary window are used to catch shards 
and prevent them from entering an occupied 
room in a target building.  For each design 
in Figure 11, the blast is occurring to the left 
and the target room is to the right. To further 
prevent glass shards, many designers use 
laminated annealed glass.  The lamination 
holds the glass shards together when broken 
and the annealed glass is weaker than others 
preventing it from transferring further load 
to the structural components of the building. 
In blast resistant building design, doors 
do not receive the attention that windows 
usually do, as people in target structures 
are generally not near exterior wall doors 
for extended periods of time.  Exterior 
blast resistant doors are often double steel 
with internal cross bracing.  They have an 
increased number of fasteners connecting 
them to the wall and secured as to not 
propel inwards upon a blast attack.  
SUMMARY
Blast resistant design is an important 
aspect for high-risk structures, including 
public, commercial and government 
buildings. Designing for blast loads has 
seen an increase over the last decade due 
in large part to the events of September 11th, 
2001, the prevalence of terroristic threats 
around the globe and the United States’ and 
United Nations’ involvement in multiple 
war zones.  To better design structures to 
negate the effects of a blast attack, it is 
necessary to examine a structure’s specific 
response to the initial blast pressure wave 
as well as the secondary building behavior 
once the blast has subsided. Research must 
be conducted to determine the buildings’ 
natural properties (mass, stiffness, natural 
frequency) in order to predict the buildings’ 
responses. Buildings’ strength is essential 
in preventing immediate collapse from 
the blast magnitude, and to withstand the 
dynamic response. Building damage through 
progressive collapse can be prevented 
with redundancy systems. Furthermore, 
a building’s response is not limited to its 
structural elements. Designing for extreme 
loading involves the building owner, 
structural engineer, architect and blast 
design experts. It is crucial to mitigate the 
threat of hostile vehicles as well as design a 
structure in coordination with the integrated 
physical security system. Building materials 
and architectural elements can provide 
increased levels of safety and performance 
of structures. The first, and most important 
step in increasing blast resistance is the 
need to create a large standoff distance.  
This is achieved through multiple 
techniques of hostile vehicle mitigation 
and vehicle security barriers.  Once a blast 
is detonated outside of the standoff zone, 
while lessened, the blast will still affect the 
target building.  For this reason, potential 
target buildings must be built with extreme 
durable materials such a cast-in-place 
reinforced concrete or steel-fiber-reinforced 
pre-cast concrete.  Once the exterior of the 
building is constructed from either of these, 
windows capable of handling specific blast 
zthreats must be installed as well as similarly 
capable doors.
FUTURE WORK
Blast resistant building design research 
has been growing rapidly. The prediction 
models are quickly becoming more 
advanced as technology improves. The 
high demand for blast resistant buildings 
is creating opportunities for research and 
development. Focused efforts will lead to 
finding better materials and techniques to be 
used in the building of protective structures. 
As improved methods are discovered 
and implemented, people will have to 
continually look for the most cost effective 
ways to adequately withstand the blasts to 
be expected. 
Figure 10. Shard Reduction in Windows 27  
